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1THE COMPOSITE PROTOCOL TEXT:
AN EFFECTIVE STRENGTHENING
OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
by Graham S. Pearson* , Malcolm R. Dando§ & Nicholas A. Sims†
Introduction
1.  Before, during and immediately after the twenty-second session of the Ad Hoc Group
from 12 to 23 February 2001, the Chairman, Ambassador Tibor Tóth provided delegations
with written elements for virtually the complete Protocol.  Several delegations including
South Africa and the European Union (speaking also on behalf of the nine Central and
Eastern European countries associated with the European Union and the associated countries
Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) called on Ambassador Tóth to provide a Chairman's text as
delegations needed to see the complete picture in order to complete the negotiations.
2.  On Thursday 29 March 2001 at a seminar entitled "Facing the Challenge of Disease in the
21st Century" organized in Geneva by the Quaker United Nations Office and the University
of Bradford Department of Peace Studies, Dr Guenael Rodier, Director, Department of
Communicable Disease and Surveillance, WHO spoke on "Preventing Disease:  The
Challenge for WHO", a message from Lt. Gen Jansen van Rensberg, Surgeon General of the
South African National Defence Forces "Countering Disease in Africa" was presented and
Professor Graham S. Pearson spoke on "Preventing Deliberate Disease: The Protocol
Contribution." These presentations and the subsequent discussion focussed on the
complementary nature of the BTWC Protocol and the WHO in combating disease and the
opportunities and benefits that such cooperation could bring to all countries, both developing
and developed.  Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, was in
the chair and took the opportunity to say that a composite text would be available for
delegations in Geneva during the afternoon of Friday 30 March 2000.   It was thus clear that
the requests by several delegations during the February 2001 Ad Hoc Group session for a
complete Protocol text have been answered  with the provision by Ambassador Toth of a
composite text that is clearly based on the rolling text with compromises adopted to address
the remaining differing views.
3.  This Evaluation Paper considers the composite Protocol text1, compares it with the latest
version of the rolling text2 and evaluates the compromises that had been adopted to resolve
the differing views of delegations.  It then considers the potential contribution that the
Protocol based on the composite text will make to strengthening the regime against biological
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2weapons.  A comparison is made of the BTWC Protocol regime to a regime based on the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention alone and then a comparison of the Protocol
regime and the Chemical Weapons Convention regime.  It is concluded that the Protocol
regime brings significant and worthwhile benefits to all States Parties -- both developed and
developing  -- over and above the basic prohibitions and obligations of the BTWC.  In
addition, the Protocol will be effective, over time, in building confidence between States
Parties that other States Parties are indeed in compliance with the Convention, thereby
reinforcing the norm that work on biological weapons, whether directed against humans,
animals or plants, is totally prohibited.  The Protocol will thus bring improved health, safety,
security and prosperity to all States Parties.
The Composite Protocol Text
4.  The previous Bradford Evaluation Papers have evaluated and analysed the majority of the
Articles in the Protocol and the Bradford Briefing Papers have addressed many of the key
issues for the Ad Hoc Group.  In this Evaluation Paper, the composite Protocol text
provisions are examined and compared with the latest version of the rolling text with
emphasis being placed on those issues where compromises have been adopted to resolve the
differing views.   The composite Protocol text has a Preamble with 30 Articles, 3 Annexes
and 9 Appendices;  the Articles have arabic numerals instead on roman numerals as in the
rolling text.  The following Table shows the relationship of the composite Protocol structure
to that of the rolling text attached to the procedural report of the February 2001 session.
Although it is recognised that the composite Protocol text also bears a close relationship to
the written elements addressing conceptual solutions provided to delegations by the Chairman
following his informal bilateral consultations and that by February 2001 such written
elements had been provided for virtually the whole of the Protocol, the comparison in this
Evaluation Paper is between the composite Protocol text (CRP.8) and the latest version of the
rolling text (AHG/55).
Composite Protocol text (CRP.8) Previously in rolling text (AHG/55-1 & 55-2)
Preamble Preamble
Article 1 General Provisions Article I General Provisions
Article 2 Definitions Article II Definitions
Article 3 Lists and Criteria, Equipment and
Thresholds
Article III A, B, C Lists and Criteria, Equipment
and Thresholds
Article 4  Declarations Article III D I Declarations
Article 5  Measures to ensure submission of
declarations
Article III D III  Measures to ensure submission
of declarations
Article 6  Follow-up after submission of
declarations
Article III D II  Follow-up after submission of
declarations
Article 7  Measures to strengthen
implementation of Article III of the
Convention
Article III F  Measures to strengthen
implementation of Article III (of the Convention)
Article 8  Consultation, Clarification and
Cooperation
Article III E  Consultation, Clarification and
Cooperation
Article 9 Investigations Article III G Investigations
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Article 10 Additional provisions on
declarations, visits and investigations
Article III H Additional provisions on
declarations, visits and investigations
Article 11  Confidentiality provisions Article IV  Confidentiality provisions
Article 12 Measures to redress a situation
and to ensure compliance
Article V Measures to redress a situation and to
ensure compliance
Article 13  Assistance and protection against
bacteriological (biological) weapons
Article VI  Assistance and protection against
bacteriological (biological) weapons
Article 14 Scientific and technological
exchange for peaceful purposes and technical
co-operation
Article VII Scientific and technological
exchange for peaceful purposes and technical co-
operation
Article 15 Confidence-building measures Article VIII Confidence-building measures
Article 16 The Organization Article IX The Organization
Article 17 National implementation
measures
Article X National implementation measures
Article 18 Relationship of the Protocol to the
Convention
Article XI Relationship of the Protocol to the
Convention
Article 19 Settlement of disputes Article XII Settlement of disputes
Article 20 Review of the Protocol Article XIII Review of the Protocol
Article 21 Amendments Article XIV Amendments
Article 22 Duration and Withdrawal Article XV Duration and Withdrawal
Article 23 Status of the Annexes and
Appendices
Article XVI Status of the Annexes and
Appendices
Article 24 Signature Article XVII Signature
Article 25 Ratification Article XVIII Ratification
Article 26 Accession Article XIX Accession
Article 27 Entry into Force Article XX Entry into Force
Article 28 Reservations Article XXI Reservations
Article 29 Depositary Article XXII Depositary
Article 30 Authentic Texts Article XXIII Authentic Texts
5.  The following sections of the composite Protocol text are addressed below:
a.  Preamble
b.  Article 1 General Provisions
c.  Article 2 Definitions
d.  Article 3 Lists and Criteria, Equipment and Thresholds
e.  Article 4  Declarations
f.  Article 5  Measures to ensure submission of declarations
g.  Article 6  Follow-up after submission of declarations
4h.  Article 7  Measures to strengthen implementation of Article III of the Convention
i.  Article 8  Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation
j.  Article 9 Investigations
k. Article 10 Additional provisions on declarations, visits and investigations
l.  Article 11  Confidentiality provisions
m.  Article 13  Assistance and protection against bacteriological (biological) weapons
n. Article 14 Scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and
technical co-operation
o.  Article 15 Confidence-Building measures
p.  Article 16 The Organization
q.  Legal issues (15 Articles including Article 12 Measures to redress a situation and
ensure compliance)
In our analysis, we have evaluated and compared the composite Protocol text to the language
in the rolling text.  It should be noted that there have been some editorial changes made in the
composite Protocol text such as the replacement of "pursuant to" by "in accordance with"
which have not changed the substance.  Consequently where we state that the composite
Protocol text is identical to that in the rolling text we disregard any minor editorial changes
that have no effect on the substance.
Preamble
5.  The composite text has taken all the paragraphs in the rolling text that were out of overall
square brackets and omitted five of the six that were in overall square brackets.  The sixth one
that had been within overall square brackets is included thus achieving a balance between
paragraphs addressing the implementation of Article X of the Convention and a paragraph
reaffirming the obligations under Article III of the Convention.   The paragraphs omitted do
not, in our view, result in any diminution to the overall thrust of the Preamble.
Article 1  General Provisions
6.  The composite text has taken all the paragraphs that were in the rolling text that were out
of overall square brackets and omitted all but one of those paragraphs that were within overall
square brackets.  A new opening paragraph stating the purpose of the Protocol has been added
that draws upon some of the concepts within two of the paragraphs within overall square
brackets and a new final paragraph has been added which usefully makes it clear that the
definitions and objective criteria shall be used solely for the application of specific measures
set out in the Protocol..  The single paragraph that was within overall square brackets that has
been included is the one which requires the States Parties and the Director-General, as
appropriate, to take into account existing agreements and competencies of other relevant
international organisations and agencies in order to avoid duplication and to ensure an
effective and co-ordinated use of resources.   This paragraph had previously been included
5within Article VII of the rolling text.  Its inclusion to Article 1 General Provisions thereby
making it applicable to the entire Protocol is laudable.    None of the omitted paragraphs, in
our view, result in any diminution of the provisions of Article 1 General Provisions.
Article 2  Definitions
7.  Article 2 is based on the language and definitions in Article II Definitions of the rolling
text.  The composite Protocol text has rightly concentrated as required by the mandate for the
Ad Hoc Group on definitions of terms where relevant for specific measures designed to
strengthen the Convention.   Three basic definitions have been included in Article 2 for
Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, Purposes not prohibited by the Convention,
and a new definition of Biological materials which is for use with the transparency threshold
levels for facilities involved in national biological defence programmes and/or activities.  The
first two of these basic definitions are drawn directly from the relevant language in Article I
of the Convention thereby ensuring that the definitions used in the Protocol in no way amend
the basic prohibitions in the Convention.  The inclusion of these three basic definitions and
the omission of three other basic definitions from the rolling text represents a fair
compromise.
8.  The remaining definitions in Article 2 are all based on the definitions in the rolling text;
15 of these have essentially identical language to that in the rolling text with the removal of
square brackets and the adoption of appropriate compromises.  The definition of facility has
been clarified with one definition for the purposes of declarations and follow-up after
declarations and another definition for the purpose of investigations.  A useful definition has
also been added for national biological defence programmes and/or activities. Three
additional definitions are now included in Article 2 for Conference, Director-General and
Organisation.
9.  Article 2 has successfully adopted compromises to ensure that there are no definitions in
the Protocol which has the effect of amending the Convention itself and that the definitions in
Article 2 are for the purpose of implementation of the Protocol alone.
Article 3 Lists and Criteria, Equipment and Thresholds
10.  Article 3 comprises three sections:
A.  List of Agents and Toxins
B.  List of Equipment
C.  Annual and Current Transparency Threshold Levels
which are based upon language previously contained in Annex A of the rolling text.  Each of
the sections is considered in turn:
a.  A.  List of Agents and Toxins.  This section of Article 3 now contains the
chapeau text which had previously appeared in Annex A I. Lists and Criteria (Agents
and Toxins) whilst the list of agents and toxins is retained in Annex A of the
composite Protocol text.   The first paragraph makes it clear that the list of agents is
for use with the declaration trigger for work with listed agents and toxins as well as
for the declaration formats for national biodefence programmes and for declared
facilities.  The second paragraph usefully emphasises that the list of agents and toxins
in Annex A is not exhaustive and does not exclude the relevance of unlisted microbial
6or other biological agents or toxins.   The third and fourth paragraphs set out the
procedure for review and modification of the list of agents which requires that the
Executive Council shall consider the same criteria which had previously appeared out
of square brackets in Annex A. I of the rolling text.
The list of agents and toxins appears in the composite Protocol text in the Annex on
Lists (Annex A) A.  Lists of Agents and Toxins.  This is essentially identical to the list
in Annex A of the rolling text with compromises adopted where there had been agents
still within square brackets in the rolling text; in respect of the human and zoonotic
pathogens list the composite Protocol text includes Brucella suis but not Brucella
abortus, Nagleria fowleri but not Nagleria australiensis.  For the animal pathogen list
which was less developed in the rolling text, the composite Protocol text has adopted
a compromise list of six animal pathogens.  The plant pathogen list contains the same
eight plant pathogens listed in the rolling text and the list of toxins is also the same as
in the rolling text.
b.  B.  List of Equipment.  This section consists of three paragraphs which set out
which declaration triggers and declaration formats apply to the list of equipment and
also provides for the use of the list of equipment during a facility investigation.
Finally the provisions for the review and amendment of the list are stated.
The list of equipment appears in the composite Protocol text in the Annex on Lists
(Annex A) B.  Lists of Equipment and is essentially identical to that in Annex A.II of
the rolling text which was largely out of square brackets.   Sensibly, the requirement
in square brackets in the rolling text to provide information on biological safety
cabinets Class II has been removed.
c.  Annual and Current Transparency Threshold Levels.  This section of some
nine paragraphs has been developed from Article III. C. Thresholds of the rolling text.
The compromise adopted in the composite Protocol text recognises the long debate
about thresholds during the VEREX process, at the Special Conference which
established the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group and during the Ad Hoc Group
negotiations.   This section makes it clear that the transparency thresholds set out are
to provide additional transparency for national biological defence programmes and/or
activities through the provision of information on the aggregate quantities, expressed
in ranges, for all biological materials, defined as in Article 2, present at such a facility
during the previous year.   This information is to be provided in the declaration
formats for such facilities in Appendix C.
Article 4  Declarations
11.  Article 4 which sets out the declaration triggers is closely based on the language in
Article III. D. Declarations I. Submission of Declarations in the rolling text.   It is subdivided
into three sections:
A.  Submission of Declarations
B.  Initial Declarations
C.  Annual Declarations
712.  Section A consists of two paragraphs which set out first the requirement for States
Parties to declare all activities and facilities listed in this Article and for the appropriate
declaration format in the Appendices to be submitted not later than 180 days after the entry
into force of the Protocol for initial declarations and no later than 30 April each year for
annual declarations.  This language is essentially identical to that in the two paragraphs out of
square brackets in the initial section of Article III. D. I of the rolling text.  The other
paragraphs which had been in square brackets in the initial section of Article III. D. I have are
now addressed in Articles 10 and 21 of the composite Protocol text and are therefore removed
from Article 4.
13.  Section B requires two initial declarations -- first of offensive biological weapons
programmes and/or activities conducted in the period between 1 January 1946 and entry into
force of the Convention for that State Party and secondly of defensive biological weapons
programmes and/or activities conducted during the 10 years prior to the entry into force of the
Protocol for that State Party.    These provisions are based on the language in Article III.  D. I
of the rolling text and have reasonably adopted the same date for the start of past offensive
programmes and/or activities as in the Confidence-Building Measure F agreed by the States
Parties at the Third Review Conference in 1991. Any information on past offensive
programmes that subsequently comes to light has also to be declared within a specified time
period.   The information required in these initial declarations is to be provided as specified in
the declaration format in Appendix A and rightly seeks additional detail for the 10 years prior
to entry into force of the Convention or of the Protocol and as such is a reasonable
compromise.   We recommend that on the basis of consensus a change should be made to the
first subtitle in Section B so that this reads "Offensive biological and toxin programmes
and/or activities conducted prior to entry into force of the Convention for each State Party"
and is thereby consistent with the language in paragraph 3 and the title of Appendix A.
14.  Section C sets out the requirements for annual declarations of national biological defence
programmes and/or activities, maximum biological containment facilities, high biological
containment facilities which exceed 100 m2 and have produced vaccines or other specified
production or have carried out genetic modification of any agent or toxin listed in Annex A,
plant pathogen containment, specified work with listed agents and toxins and specified
production facilities.   These provisions are based on the language in Article III. D. I of the
rolling text.    The compromises adopted in respect of these various declaration triggers
ensure that facilities of very little relevance are excluded.  Consequently, biodefence
programmes/activities involving perhaps a single person monitoring developments in the
literature are excluded as are high biological containment facilities with a working area of
less than 100 m2 and similarly plant pathogen containment facilities with a working area of
less than 100 m2.
15.  The compromise adopted for biological defence programmes/activities requires a
summary of the objectives and elements of the programme -- rightly including research and
development, testing, evaluation and production -- as well as a summary of the research and
development carried out in accordance with Appendix B.  The requirements for the
declaration of national biodefence facilities in accordance with Appendix C strikes a balance
between the requirements for States Parties with large programmes and many facilities and
those States Parties with much smaller programmes and fewer facilities.
16.  The requirements in Article 4 for maximum biological containment facilities and for
plant pathogen containment facilities are closely similar to those in  Article III. D. I of the
8rolling text.   In respect of high biological containment, the requirement in Article 4 has
usefully been more sharply focussed onto relevant production facilities and facilities in which
genetic engineering of listed agents and toxins than the previous language in the rolling text.
The requirements for facilities which have engaged in work with listed agents and/or toxins is
based on the language in Article III. D. I of the rolling text with the removal of square
brackets and the adoption of reasonable compromises in respect of the various capacities that
had previously been in square brackets.  The requirement is that a declaration is necessary if
work with the listed agent and/or toxin is associated with specified production and recovery
features, certain forms of genetic engineering or certain types of aerosolisation activities.
17.  The requirements for the declaration of production facilities have usefully been brought
together requiring the declaration of vaccine, microorganism and biological control agent
production under specified circumstances.  A final paragraph additionally requires general
information to be provided on certain facilities producing for public sale microbially
produced substances. Provision is made for the First Review Conference to consider whether
such facilities should become subject to randomly-selected transparency visits in the light of
the experience that will then have been gained on the implementation of the Protocol.
18.  Overall, Article 4 has successfully focussed on requiring States Parties to declare those
facilities and activities of the greatest relevance to the Convention.
Article 5  Measures to ensure submission of declarations
19.  Article 5 follows closely the language in Article III. D. III.  Measures to ensure the
submission of declarations in the rolling text.   The first three paragraphs are identical to
those in the rolling text.  Article 5 in its subsequent six paragraphs has struck a reasonable
balance in relation to the options within square brackets in the rolling text relating to the
consequences should a State Party not have submitted its initial declarations within one year
or its annual declarations within six months after the deadlines specified in Article 4.   It has
adopted a three tier approach which combines some automatic measures with some
conditional measures which have to be considered by the Executive Council:
a.  If the State Party has not submitted its initial declarations within one year or its
annual declarations within six months after the deadlines specified in Article 4 then it
shall not have access to the declarations of other States Parties.
b. In addition, the Executive Council shall consider whether to apply one or more of
three further measures until the declarations are received.
c.  If the State Party has not submitted its initial declarations within two years or its
annual declarations within a year after the deadlines specified in Article 4, then two
further measures shall apply until the declarations are received.
Article 6  Follow-up after submission of declarations
20.  Article 6 is developed from and is based on the provisions and language in Article III.
Declarations II.  Follow-up after the submission of declarations in the rolling text.  Article 6
is subdivided into four sections:
9A.  The role of the Technical Secretariat
B.  Randomly-selected transparency visits
C.  Voluntary assistance visits
D.  Declaration clarification procedures.
21.  Section A on the role of the Technical Secretariat starts with two paragraphs identical to
the first two in Article III. D. II of the rolling text.  Its third paragraph states what the
Technical Secretariat is to do to promote the fulfilment of the declaration obligations under
the Protocol.  These are to process and make a technical analysis of the declarations, conduct
a limited number of randomly-selected transparency visits to facilities declared in accordance
with certain paragraphs in Article 4, seek clarification should any ambiguity, uncertainty,
anomaly or omission be identified in the content of a declaration, provide technical assistance
to States Parties and help them compile their declarations including a voluntary assistance
visit, if requested.  The fourth paragraph relates to the procedures whereby a State Party may
seek a clarification regarding the declaration of another State Party; the State Party seeking
clarification can do so either using the provisions of Article 8 Consultation, Clarification and
Cooperation or by using the clarification process in this Article.
22.  The next ten paragraphs relate to the allocation of the different types of visits, the
selection of facilities for randomly-selected transparency visits, the limitations on such visits
and on voluntary clarification visits, the review of these provisions by the first and
subsequent Review Conferences and the annual programme of visits and its review by the
Executive Council.   The key elements are the following:
a.  An overall limit for the total number of all visits in any calendar year of 120 -- with
provision for the Director-General to conduct less in the light of declarations
submitted and visits requested.
b.  Limits for the number of randomly-selected transparency visits of not more than
75% and not less than 50% of the total number of visits -- i.e. between 60 and 90 such
visits.
c.  Limits for the number of voluntary assistance visits of not more than 25% and not
less than 5 % of the total number of visits -- i.e. between 6 and 30 such visits.
d.  Any clarification visits are deducted successively from the number of randomly-
selected transparency visits and the number of voluntary assistance visits whilst
ensuring that the minimum numbers of such visits are conducted.
Provision is also made for the first and subsequent Review Conferences to revise the total
number of visits and their allocation between the different categories in the light of the
experience gained in the implementation of the Protocol.
23.   In addition limits are placed on the numbers of visits so that they are distributed equably
among the States Parties as follows:
a.  No State Party shall receive more than seven randomly-selected transparency visits
in any calendar year.
b.  Each State Party which declares facilities shall receive at least two randomly-
selected transparency visits in any five-year period.
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c.  No individual facility shall receive more than three randomly-selected transparency
visits in any five year period.
d.  The probability of a State Party receiving a visit shall be proportional to the
number of declared facilities in that State Party taking into account the limits detailed
in the preceding subparagraphs a to c.
Insofar as voluntary clarification visits are concerned, no State Party shall receive more than
five such visits in any five-year period.
24.  It is thus evident that the composite Protocol text has successfully adopted a number of
compromises which together ensure an effective follow-up after the submission of
declarations with an equable spread of visits between States Parties and across the range of
facilities subject to this Article.
25.  Section B is closely based on the provisions and language in Article III. D. II (A)
Randomly-selected Visits in the rolling text.   The purpose of randomly-selected transparency
visits is clearly set out as:
a.  Increasing confidence in the consistency of declarations with the activities of the
facility and encouraging submission of complete and consistent declarations;
b.  Enhancing transparency of facilities subject to the provisions of this section;
c.  Helping the Technical Secretariat to acquire and retain a comprehensive and up-to-
date understanding of the facilities and activities declared globally.
In addition, randomly-selected transparency visits can be extended by up to two days if
requested in order for the visiting team to provide assistance on any of the subjects or
programmes listed in the relevant paragraphs of Article 14.
26.  The detailed provisions for carrying out such randomly-selected transparency visits are
essentially the same as in the rolling text.   It is made clear that the visited State Party shall
provide access to the visiting team within the facility sufficient to fulfil its mandate whilst
leaving the nature and extent of all access inside the facility, and to the information it
contains, to the discretion of the visited State Party.
27.  Section C.   The provisions for voluntary assistance visits are essentially the same as in
Article III. D. II (A) Voluntary Assistance Visits in the rolling text.   It is, however, noted that
the purposes of the voluntary assistance visits as detailed in paragraph 49 (b) refer only to
paragraph 21 of Article 14 and not to paragraph 23 of Article 14.   As this is inconsistent with
the provision for the extension of randomly-selected transparency visits for up to two days in
relation to both paragraphs 21 and 23 and is also inconsistent with the provision in paragraph
23 of Article 14 which specifically cross refers to paragraph 49 (b) of Article 6, we
recommend that on the basis of consensus paragraph 49 (b) be amended to refer to "as
specified in Article 14 (21) and 14 (23);".
28.  Section D is closely based on the provisions and language in Article III. D. II (A)
Declaration Clarification Procedures in the rolling text.  The composite Protocol text has
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adopted a compromise in that it provides an option as to whether such clarification is carried
out using the procedures set out in Article 6 or by the consultation, clarification and
cooperation procedures set out in Article 8.  In the particular case of clarification requests
relating to a facility which is believed to meet the criteria for declaration and which has not
been declared, then the State party from whom clarification is requested may at its discretion
respond either using the procedures in Article 8 or the procedures in Article 6.
29.  Insofar as the Director-General is concerned, a compromise has been adopted under
which the Director-General can initiate the declaration clarification procedure in regard to the
content of a declaration submitted by a State Party but in respect of a facility which is
believed to meet the criteria for declaration and which has not been declared, the Director-
General may request the State Party to submit a declaration for the facility concerned.
30.  The detailed procedures are closely similar to those in the rolling text.  However, should
the declaration clarification procedure not resolve the issue and if a suggested voluntary
clarification visit is not offered, then the Director-General shall make a report to the
Executive Council.  The composite Protocol text sets out a range of decisions that might be
taken by the Executive Council including the decision initiate a clarification visit.  It is clear
that the composite Protocol text has taken care to strike a balance between the interests of all
delegations.
Article 7  Measures to strengthen implementation of Article III of the Convention
31.  Article 7 has been developed from the provisions and language in Article III. F. Measures
to strengthen the implementation of Article III.   The title of Article 7 has usefully been
modified to make it clear that these are measures related to Article III of the Convention.
Article 7 has been restructured thereby improving clarity into five sections:
A.  Implementing Legislation
B.  Transfer Guidelines
C.  Notifications
D.  Consultations
E.  Review
a.  Section A on implementing legislation contains language from Article III. F of the
rolling text requiring States parties to review, amend or establish any legislation,
regulatory or administrative provisions to regulate the transfer of agents, toxins,
equipment and technologies relevant to the Convention, providing assistance from the
Technical Secretariat in this respect and requiring States Parties to report any
legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions or other measures it has taken to
implement Article III of the Convention.
b.  Section B on transfer guidelines draws upon language from Article III. F of the
rolling text and requires States Parties to take all measures they deem necessary to
ensure that obligations under Article III of the Convention are implemented fully and
effectively. Measures are also required to ensure that transfers to any recipient
whatsoever of dual-use items are only used for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes; these may include four measures which are set out.   Four
particular dual-use items are identified to which such measures are to be applied to
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ensure that their use is only for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes are
to be taken.
c.  Section C on notifications requires States Parties to use the reporting format in
Appendix I to notify the Director-General annually of aggregate data on exports of the
four particular dual-use items identified in Section B.
d.  Section D on consultations provides for States Parties to consult among
themselves on the implementation of the provisions of this Article and also with a
view to specifying the context of a request for a transfer.  It also provides for a State
Party, which has a concern that an authorised transfer could be in violation of Article
III of the Convention, to consult directly with the transferring State Party.   Additional
supporting information that might be provided during these consultations is
elaborated.
e.  Section E provides for the first Conference of States Parties held after the first
Review Conference of the Protocol to review the operation of the provisions of this
Article and to consider whether the introduction of restrictions or prohibitions on
transfer to States not party to the Protocol or the Convention of the four particular
dual-use items identified in Section B would further universal adherence to the
Protocol.  Subsequent Review Conferences shall keep under review the provisions of
this Article.
32.  Article 7 has struck a balance between the range of different views as to how the
implementation of Article III of the Convention should be improved.   It was concluded in the
University of Bradford Briefing Paper No 333 in February 2001 that:
The issue of how to improve the implementation of Article III of the Convention has
been an emotive and sensitive topic for the Ad Hoc Group.  In a world in which
transfers of dual use materials – whether of chemicals, biological agents or drugs –
are increasingly being monitored and controlled, it is not an option to ignore
measures to improve the implementation of Article III of the Convention.  It is also
unrealistic to consider the removal of such monitoring and controls between States
Parties as the trend is the opposite.  However, under a regime in which there is
greater transparency as to what transferred materials are to be used for and are used
for together with assurances that there are the necessary national internal and
interstate controls of transfers, the probability over time will increase that transfers
between States Parties will be made.    A pragmatic approach would be to make
provision for some initial controls of transfers of both biological agents and
equipment, with a requirement for States Parties to report to the Organization
annually on such  transfers, along with provisions enabling this transfer regime to be
reviewed and developed by States Parties at the Review Conferences of the Protocol.
33.  Article 7 has, in our view, successfully addressed the difficult issue of how to improve
the implementation of Article III of the Convention through requiring States Parties to take
necessary implementing legislation; setting out transfer guidelines; requiring annual
notifications of aggregate data for four particular dual-use items; providing for consultations;
                                                
3Graham S. Pearson, The BTWC Protocol: Improving the Implementation of Article III of the Convention:
Pragmatic Considerations, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 33,
February 2001.
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and requiring the implementation of these provisions to be kept under review.   The approach
adopted in Article 7 provides a reasonable compromise that will contribute over time to the
strengthened effectiveness and improved implementation of the Convention.
Article 8  Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation
34.  Article 8 sets out the provision that States Parties should consult and cooperate directly
among themselves on any matter relating to the purpose and objective of the Convention, or
the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol, and clarify and resolve any matter
which may raise concern about possible non-compliance with the obligations of this Protocol
or the Convention.  It follows closely the language in Article III. E Consultation,
Clarification and Cooperation of the rolling text.  Article 8 has in some paragraphs
simplified the rolling text by removing unnecessary duplication or repetition and striking a
balance between the options within square brackets in the rolling text; for example, the time
within which clarification shall be provided is reasonably set at 20 days after receipt of the
request.
Article 9 Investigations
35.  Article 9 is largely based on the provisions and language in Article III. G. Investigations
of the rolling text.   It is subdivided into nine subsections:
A.  Types of Investigations
B.  Outbreaks of Disease
C.  Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation
D.  Initiation of Investigations
E. Information to be Submitted with a Request for an Investigation to Address a
Concern of Non-compliance with the Convention
F.  Follow-up after Submission of an Investigation Request and Executive Council
Decision-making
G.  Access and Measures to Guard Against Abuse During the Conduct of
Investigations
H.  Final Report
I.  Review and Consideration of the Final Report.
36.  Section A sets out the two types of investigation:  field and facility investigations using
language that is essentially identical to that in the rolling text.
37.  Section B has language that is essentially identical to that in the rolling text with some
small variations in the titles of subheadings and of the language.  This section deals with
outbreaks of disease and the circumstances under which a field investigation of an outbreak
of disease can be requested to address a non-compliance concern.  It is also made clear that
reports coming exclusively from the mass media cannot be regarded as evidence.
38.  Section C has language that is closely based on that in the rolling text and requires that
States Parties should, whenever possible, consult between themselves in accordance with
Article 8 about any matter that causes concern about compliance with the Convention.
39.  Sections D and E have language that is essentially identical to that in the rolling text.
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40.  Section F addresses the follow-up after submission of an investigation request and
Executive Council decision making.  This is based upon and developed from the language in
the rolling text.  Section F has adopted a compromise in respect of the Executive Council
decision making in which different decision-making procedures are to be followed depending
on the particular circumstances relating to the investigation:
a. A request for a field investigation of alleged use of biological weapons on the
territory or other place under the control of the requesting State Party shall proceed
unless a three-quarters majority of members present and voting decide otherwise.
b. A request for a field investigation of alleged use of biological weapons on the
territory or other place under the control of another State Party shall proceed unless a
simple majority of members present and voting decide otherwise.
c. A request for a field investigation on the territory or other place under the control of
a requesting State Party where there is a concern that an outbreak of disease is related
to prohibited activities shall proceed unless two-thirds of members present and voting
decide otherwise.
d. A request for a field investigation on the territory or other place under the control of
another State Party when there is a concern that an outbreak of disease is related to
prohibited activities shall proceed only if approved by a simple majority of members
present and voting.
e. A request for a facility investigation should proceed only if approved by a simple
majority of members present and voting.
The key thing is that in all these cases an investigation will take place if the Executive
Council so decides thereby providing the Protocol with the essential ultimate measure to
address concerns about non-compliance with the Convention.
41.  Section G is closely similar to the language in the rolling text.  Essentially the receiving
State Party is obliged to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with the
Convention and to enable the investigation team complete its mandate.  However, the nature
and extent of access shall be negotiated between the investigation team and the receiving
State Party with the receiving State party having the right to make the final decision on the
nature and extent of access, taking into account its rights and obligations under the Protocol.
The composite Protocol text has thus struck a reasonable balance to ensure that investigations
can be carried out effectively whilst safeguarding the interests of the receiving State Party.
42.  Section H is essentially identical to the language in the rolling text.
43.  Section I is essentially identical to the language in the rolling text with the addition of a
new paragraph which usefully specifies that, in the event of non-compliance being
determined, the Executive Council shall circulate the final report to all State Parties before
the meeting of the Conference of State Parties.
Article 10 Additional provisions on declarations, visits and investigations
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44.  The additional provisions of Article 10, which addresses declarations, visits and
investigations on the territory of a State Party but falling under the control of another State
Party/Party, closely follow the language in Article III H. Additional Provisions of the rolling
text.  Article 10 has struck a balance between the alternative language in the rolling text and
has also introduced a new Appendix G Facilities existing in the territory of a State Party but
falling under the control of another State Party/Party which is to be completed by the State
Party on whose territory the facility exists;  this simply requires answers to some YES/NO
questions.   The overall thrust of Article 10 is not substantively different from that in the
rolling text;  Article 10 provides a useful complement to the regime in regard to declarations,
visits and investigations under such circumstances.
Article 11  Confidentiality provisions
45.  The six paragraphs of Article 11 are essentially identical to the first six paragraphs of
Article IV Confidentiality Provisions in the rolling text.  The other paragraphs in Article IV in
the rolling text which were within square brackets and which reproduced the language of
Annex D which was out of square brackets apart from a single paragraph are included in the
Chairman's composite Protocol text in the Annex on Confidentiality Provisions (Annex C).
The square brackets have been removed from the only paragraph in Annex D which had been
within square brackets -- this obliges observers and States Parties sending observers to an
investigation to protect confidential information should such information be disclosed to or
acquired by such observers during an investigation.   The removal of these square brackets is
both reasonable and sensible.
Article 13  Assistance and protection against bacteriological (biological) weapons
46.  Article 13 is largely unchanged from Article VI Assistance and Protection against
Biological and Toxin Weapons in the rolling text.  There are a number of small changes
relating to text that had been within square brackets in the rolling text.  These changes are as
follows:
a.  Paragraph 1.  The phrase "including biosensors" which had been in square brackets
is included in the composite Protocol text.  Given that biosensors are frequently an
integral part of detection equipment, the inclusion of the words "including biosensors"
provides a useful clarification which does not significantly amend the substance.
b.  Paragraph 3.  This has been simplified by the removal of the clauses which had
been in square brackets in the rolling text.   Paragraph 3 in the composite Protocol text
is identical to the corresponding paragraph in Article X of the CWC.
c.  Paragraph 9.  The square brackets around the word "serious" have been removed in
the composite Protocol text which is thus identical to the corresponding language in
Article X of the CWC.
d.  Paragraph 10.  The rolling text had two alternative forms of words which were
both within square brackets.   The composite Protocol text requires that requests for
assistance when a State Party considers that biological or toxin weapons have been
used against them shall be accompanied, either simultaneously or within 24 hours by a
request for an investigation.
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e.  Paragraph 11.  The rolling text had various times within square brackets.  The
composite Protocol text has these square brackets removed and the time during which
the Director-General shall initiate an examination of the request has been increased
from 12 to 24 hours -- the same time as the corresponding requirement in Article X of
the CWC.  The final sentence of paragraph 11 which had several square bracketed
alternatives has been simplified without any change of substance.
f.  Paragraph 12.  The rolling text had various times within square brackets.    The
composite Protocol text has these square brackets removed.  The times are identical to
those in the corresponding paragraph in Article X of the CWC.
Article 14 Scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and technical co-
operation
47.  Article 14 is largely unchanged from Article VII Scientific and Technological Exchange
for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Cooperation in the rolling text.  Article 14 is
subdivided into seven subsections:
A.  General Provisions
B.  Measures to Promote Scientific and Technological Exchanges
C.  Measures to Avoid Hampering the Economic and Technological Development of
States Parties
D.  Institutional Mechanisms for International Cooperation and Protocol
Implementation Assistance
E.  Review and Consideration of Concerns Related to the Implementation of Article X
of the Convention and this Article
F.  Co-operative Relationships with Other International Organizations and Among
States Parties
G.  Declarations.
48.  Section A is closely based on the language in Article VII (A) General Provisions.  In
paragraph 1 (c) the composite Protocol text has simplified the text and has struck a reasonable
balance by adopting the word "through" and in the second paragraph it has rightly simplified
the language so that the Organization shall provide a forum for the review of the
implementation of Article X of the Convention.
49.  Section B is closely similar to that in Article VII (B) Measures to Promote Scientific and
Technological Exchanges.   The composite Protocol text has adopted a different formulation
in paragraph 3 -- and elsewhere in the composite Protocol text -- using "microbial and other
biological agents" instead of the formulation "bacteriological (biological) agents" in the
rolling text.  The different formulation usefully reflects the language in Article I of the
Convention. In paragraph 4, the composite Protocol text has removed the square brackets
around "where appropriate" in the rolling text and has given the names of the various
international organizations and agencies in full instead of using their abbreviations as in the
rolling text.  There are a number of changes to the subparagraphs in paragraph 4:
a.  Paragraph 4 (a).   The composite Protocol text has usefully adopted a different
formulation with "microbial or other biological agents" replacing the more limited
"microorganisms" in the rolling text. This change has also reasonably been made in
various other paragraphs of this Article.  In paragraph 4 (a), the phrase "prophylactics
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and protection" has replaced the term "biodefence" which had been in square brackets
in the rolling text.
b.  Paragraph 4 (c) and (d).  The composite Protocol text has adopted a simpler and
broader form of words -- "including laboratories" and "including research institutes" --
than the more limited language in square brackets in the rolling text.
c.  Paragraph 4 (h).  The composite Protocol text has adopted a simple and reasonable
solution to the alternatives in square brackets in the rolling text.
d.  Paragraph 4 (i).  The composite Protocol text has usefully adopted the broader
language of "prophylactics and protection" instead of the term "biodefence" which had
resulted in this subparagraph being within overall square brackets.  The broader
language makes the subparagraph entirely appropriate to this Article.
e.  Paragraph 4 (k).  The composite Protocol text has removed the square brackets
from this subparagraph in the rolling text thereby reasonably making provision for this
Article to address whatever future specific measures might be approved by the
Conference of States Parties to improve the implementation of Article X of the
Convention and this Article.
50.  Section C.  The composite Protocol text has struck a balance in paragraph 6 between the
different alternatives within square brackets within the rolling text.  The resulting text is a
reasonable compromise.   It also removes the paragraph in the rolling text which had stated
the obvious that States Parties have the right to seek measures in accordance with Article V
of the Protocol.
51.  Section D is closely based on the language in Article VII (D) Institutional Mechanisms
for International Cooperation and Protocol Implementation Assistance in the rolling text.  In
respect of the Cooperation Committee, paragraph 7 of the composite Protocol text in the first
sentence has added a formulation that usefully links this paragraph back to paragraph 2 of this
Article.  In the second sentence it has removed from square brackets the word "monitor" in
the rolling text and removed the additional wording in square brackets in the rolling text.  The
final sentence has usefully been streamlined through a further reference back to paragraph 2
of this Article.   The composite Protocol text has in paragraph 8 adopted language on the size
of the Cooperation Committee and its distribution amongst the regional groups.  The size of
57 is six larger than the Executive Council with each regional group having one more
representative than in the Executive Council.   In paragraph 9, the first election calls for one
third of the members to be elected for one year, and two thirds for two years.  This latter
provision is surprising as it will result in due course in two-thirds of the committee changing
every three years.  It is inconsistent with the provisions in Article 16 where the 51 member
Executive Council will normally serve for two years with 25 members being elected in the
first election to serve for one year.  We recommend that the Ad Hoc Group on the basis of
consensus amend this paragraph so that "For the first election of the Committee one-third of
the members shall be elected for one year, one-third of the members being elected for two
years and one third of the members being elected for three years due regard..."  The remaining
paragraphs relating to the Cooperation Committee set out more clearly the provisions already
agreed in the rolling text.
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52.  In respect of the role of the Technical Secretariat the composite Protocol text in
paragraph 21 (a) has adopted a reasonable compromise drawing upon language and ideas in
the three alternatives in the rolling text.  In subparagraphs (h) and (i), the composite Protocol
text has reasonably removed language within square brackets in the rolling text.  The
composite Protocol text then usefully includes at this point a paragraph which occurred later
in the rolling text and requires the Technical Secretariat to contain a department devoted to
implementation of this Article thereby underlining the importance to the regime of the
contribution coming from the implementation of Article X of the Convention.
53. Section E. The composite Protocol text has adopted streamlined language in paragraph 28
which reasonably addresses the concepts relating to the actions that may be taken by the
Executive Council  in considering concerns about the implementation of Article X of the
Convention and this Article which has been contained in two paragraphs within square
brackets in the rolling text.
54.  Section F.   The composite Protocol text in paragraph 29 has added a useful introductory
phrase outlining the objectives of such co-operative relationships.  It has also given the names
of the various international organizations and agencies in full instead of using their
abbreviations as in the rolling text.  In paragraph 30 it has reasonably removed this paragraph
from the square brackets in the rolling text.  It would have been imprudent to have excluded
possible ad hoc collaborative arrangements with non-governmental organisations as it is not
possible to predict what future non-governmental organisations might exist and be
appropriate to enter into such arrangements.
55.  Section G is essentially identical to the language in the rolling text apart from the
removal of the paragraph within square brackets.
Article 15 Confidence-building measures
56.  Article 15 has identical language to that previously within overall square brackets in
Article VIII of the rolling text.
Article 16 The Organization
57.  Article 16 is essentially identical to the language in Article IX The Organization in the
rolling text apart from a few areas where compromises have been adopted.    One such area
relates to the size of the Executive Council in which the composite Protocol text has a
membership of 51 comprising of 11 States Parties from Africa, 7 States Parties from East
Asia and the Pacific, 7 States Parties from Eastern Europe, 9 States Parties from Latin
America and the Caribbean, 12 States Parties from the Western European and other States
and 5 States Parties from West and South Asia.  A second area is in Section E. Privileges and
Immunities where language providing for the concept of the waiving of the immunity of the
Organization or of the Director-General has not been included.  This exclusion parallels the
situation that applies under the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  We welcome this as we had argued in previous
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Evaluation Papers4 that inclusion of language waiving the immunity of the Organization or
the Director-General was tantamount to expressing an a priori lack of confidence in the
Organization and its Director-General and was unnecessary as should the circumstances ever
arise then the Conference of States Parties could decide on such a waiver of immunity.
58.  The provisions in paragraph 42 for the appointment of the staff of the Technical
Secretariat continues to say that "due regard shall be paid to the necessity of securing the
highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity".  In Evaluation Paper No. 145,
Article IX: The Organization, we noted in paragraph 62 that the WHO constitution
emphasised the importance of ensuring that the efficiency and integrity of the secretariat shall
be maintained at the highest level thereby avoiding the problems being faced by the OPCW in
maintaining expertise and experience.  We therefore recommend that on the basis of
consensus the language in paragraph 42 of the composite Protocol text should be amended to
read "due regard shall be paid to the necessity of securing and maintaining the highest
standards of efficiency, competence and integrity".
Legal Issues
59.  The term legal issues is used in this Evaluation Paper to refer to those Articles in the
composite Protocol text that in the rolling text had been developed by the Friend of the Chair
on Legal Issues together with Article 17 National Implementation Measures which in the
rolling text had been developed by the Friend of the Chair on national
implementation/assistance.   As most of these Articles had already reached the stage of clean
text, free from square brackets,  the composite Protocol text is identical to that in the rolling
text.  The following Table indicates which Articles have essentially identical text to that in
the rolling text.
Composite Protocol text (CRP.8) Identical to rolling text (AHG/55-1 & 55-2)
Article 12 Measures to redress a situation
and to ensure compliance
Identical to Article V Measures to redress a
situation and to ensure compliance with the
removal of square brackets from the final
paragraph so that the issue can be brought to the
attention of both the General Assembly and the
Security Council.
Article 17 National implementation
measures
Identical to Article X National implementation
measures with the removal in para 1 (a) of the
words within square brackets and in para 4 of the
words inter alia.
Article 18 Relationship of the Protocol to the
Convention
Identical to Article XI Relationship of the
Protocol to the Convention
                                                
4See, for example, Graham S. Pearson, Nicholas A. Sims, Malcolm R. Dando & Ian R. Kenyon, The BTWC
Protocol:  Proposed Complete Text for an Integrated Regime, University of Bradford, Department of Peace
Studies, Evaluation Paper No. 19, September 2000, p.16.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
5Graham S. Pearson, Nicholas A. Sims, Malcolm R. Dando & Ian R. Kenyon, Article IX: The Organization
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper No. 14, January 2000.  Available at
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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Article 19 Settlement of disputes Identical to Article XII Settlement of disputes
with  the removal of overall square brackets from
the fifth para
Article 20 Review of the Protocol Identical to Article XIII Review of the Protocol
with the removal of a non-essential explanatory
phrase in parentheses from the first para
Article 21 Amendments Identical to Article XIV Amendments with the
requirement in para 2 being for one third or more
States to support the holding of an Amendment
Conference
Article 22 Duration and Withdrawal Identical to Article XV Duration and Withdrawal
Article 23 Status of the Annexes and
Appendices
Identical to Article XVI Status of the Annexes
and Appendices
Article 24 Signature Identical to Article XVII Signature
Article 25 Ratification Identical to Article XVIII Ratification
Article 26 Accession Identical to Article XIX Accession
Article 27 Entry into Force Paragraphs 2 & 3 identical to Article XX Entry
into Force
Article 28 Reservations Square brackets in Article XXI Reservations have
been removed and one clause in square brackets
removed
Article 29 Depositary Identical to Article XXII Depositary with UN
Secretary-General as Depositary
Article 30 Authentic Texts Identical to Article XXIII Authentic Texts with
UN Secretary-General as Depositary
60.  Those Articles for which there have been changes from the rolling text are considered
briefly:
a.  Article 12 Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance is identical to
Article V in the rolling text with the removal of the square brackets from the final
paragraph so that the issue can be brought to the attention of both the General
Assembly and the Security Council.  This provision is identical to the provision in the
corresponding Article XII in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)6.
b.  Article 17 National implementation measures is identical to Article X in the rolling
text with the removal in para 1 (a) of the words within square brackets.  The words in
square brackets in Article X referred to Article I of the Protocol; no such cross-
reference is necessary to the provisions in Article 1 General Provisions of the
composite Protocol text.  This is because Article 1 does not add further prohibitions.
Instead, it reaffirms the obligations already contained in the Convention.  Linkage
with Article 1 of the Protocol is already sufficiently ensured by the similarity of
Article 1 paragraph 8 with Article 17 paragraph 1.
c.  Article 19 Settlement of disputes is identical to Article XII in the rolling text with
the removal of overall square brackets from the fifth paragraph which states that this
                                                
6Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Available on the web at
http://www.opcw.org
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Article is without prejudice to Articles 3 to 12.  It is essentially the same as the
provisions in the final paragraph of the corresponding Article XIV in the CWC.
d.  Article 20 Review of the Protocol is identical to Article XIII in the rolling text with
the removal of a non-essential explanatory phrase "(hereinafter referred to as a
"Review Conference")"  from the first paragraph.
e.  Article 21 Amendments is identical to Article XIV in the rolling text apart from the
second sentence of paragraph 1 which states that any State Party may propose
changes, in accordance with paragraph 4, to specified parts of this Protocol or its
Annexes  or its Appendices and the requirement in the second paragraph being for one
third or more States to support the holding of an Amendment Conference. This latter
provision is identical to the provision in the corresponding Article XV in the CWC.
Insofar as the provision in the second sentence of paragraph relating to changes, we
recommend that because it is clear from paragraph 4 that changes can only be
proposed to certain Annexes and Appendices and not to any parts of the Protocol, it
would be clearer if the second sentence were to be amended, on the basis of
consensus, to read that "any State Party may propose changes, in accordance with
paragraph 4 to specified Annexes and Appendices."
f.  Article 27 Entry into Force consists of three paragraphs; the second and third
paragraphs are identical to those in Article XX in the rolling text.  The first paragraph
contains language stating that:
This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments
of ratification by 65 States, which shall include seven States from Africa, four
States from East Asia and the Pacific, four States from Eastern Europe, six
States from Latin America and the Caribbean, nine States from among
Western European and other States and three States from West and South
Asia, but not earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
The number of States required to deposit their instruments of ratification broadly
reflect the composition of the Executive Council which is specified in Article 16 as
being composed of  11 States Parties from Africa, seven States Parties from East Asia
and the Pacific, seven States Parties from Eastern Europe, nine States Parties from
Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 States Parties from among Western European
and other States and five States Parties from West and South Asia.   This formulation
wisely avoids the situation in which a single State can effectively veto the entry into
force of the Protocol through withholding its instrument of ratification.
Article 27 provides for entry into force to occur 180 days after the deposit of the 65th
instrument of ratification -- an identical provision to that of Article XXI of the CWC.
This ignores the lessons learned from the entry into force of the CWC which has
shown that there are benefits from having a longer interval than 180 days between the
trigger point, when the 65th instrument of ratification has been deposited, and entry
into force on two counts:  first, once the 65th instrument of ratification is lodged, a
significant number of States then sought to ratify so that they would be States Parties
at entry into force.  A longer period would allow more States to ratify the Protocol so
that they would be States Parties to the Protocol at its entry into force and thus entitled
to provide staff for the Organization as well as receiving the benefits from the
Protocol.  The second count is a more practical consideration in that it is only at entry
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into force that the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) can commence recruitment
and training of future visiting team staff and investigation personnel.  The OPCW
PTS found that 180 days imposed immense pressure on them to meet this timescale.
A longer period would enable recruitment and training to be carried out more
thoroughly.  We recommend that the Ad Hoc Group consider changing on the basis
of consensus the provision in Article 27 from 180 days to 270 days.
g.  Article 28 Reservations is developed from Article XXI in the rolling text. The
provision in Article 28 is that the Articles and Annexes in the Protocol shall not be
subject to reservations and the Appendices shall not be subject to reservations
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol.  It is essentially the same as
the provision in the corresponding Article XXII in the CWC.
h.  Article 29 Depositary is identical to Article XXII in the rolling text with the UN
Secretary-General designated as Depositary and the other alternative deleted.  This
provision is identical to the provision in the corresponding Article XXIII in the CWC.
A consequential deletion of the alternative has occurred in Article 22, paragraph 2 and
Article 30.
i.  Article 30 Authentic Texts is identical to Article XXIII in the rolling text with the
UN Secretary-General as depositary and with London shown as the location at which
the Protocol is signed.  This provision is identical to the provision in the
corresponding Article XXIV in the CWC apart from London appearing instead of
Paris.
61.  It is thus evident that for these 15 Articles in the Chairman's composite Protocol text that
the language is essentially identical to that in the rolling text;  the single Article in which new
language has usefully been introduced is in relation to Article 27 Entry into Force.  The
provisions in the Chairman's composite Protocol text are essentially identical to those in the
corresponding Articles of the CWC.   We do, however, recommend that the Ad Hoc Group
give consideration to amending, on the basis of consensus, the duration between the trigger
point when the 65th instrument of ratification is deposited and the entry into force from 180
days to 270 days so as to benefit from the experience of the CWC.
Annexes and Appendices
62.  The composite Protocol text has three Annexes:
Annex on Lists (Annex A)
Annex on Investigations (Annex B)
Annex on Confidentiality Provisions (Annex C)
The Annex on Lists (Annex A) is, as already discussed under Article 3, closely related to the
language in Annex A Declarations I Lists and Criteria (Agents and Toxins) and Annex A
Declarations II List of Equipment  of the rolling text.   The Annex on Investigations (Annex
B) is largely based on the language in Annex C Investigations of the rolling text although
compromises have been adopted to resolve issues previously within square brackets in the
rolling text.  The Annex on Confidentiality Provisions (Annex C) is, as already discussed
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under Article 11, essentially identical to Annex D Confidentiality Provisions in the rolling
text.
63.  The composite Protocol text has nine Appendices:
Appendix A  Declarations of Offensive and/or Defensive Biological and Toxin
Programmes and/or Activities Conducted Prior to Entry into Force of the
Convention/Protocol for Each State Party
Appendix B Declaration of Current National Biological Defence Programmes
and/or Activities
Appendix C   Declaration Format for Facilities Declared in Accordance with Article 4
(6)
Appendix D   Declaration Format for Facilities Declared in Accordance with Article 4
(8) to (14)
Appendix E  Listing of Facilities in Accordance with Article 4 (7)
Appendix F  Listing of Facilities in Accordance with Article 4 (15)
Appendix G  Facilities Existing on the Territory of a State Party but Falling under the
Jurisdiction or Control of Another State Party/State
Appendix H  Information to be provided in the Declarations Required under Article
14 (33)
Appendix I  Format for Reporting International Transfers of Equipment
These provide the formats for the various declarations and listing of facilities required under
the Protocol.
Analysis of the composite Protocol text
64.  It is evident from this evaluation of the composite Protocol text that it is in many areas
identical to the language in the rolling text and is firmly based on the agreed language out of
square brackets in the rolling text.   Compromises have been adopted to address those issues
where there continued to be a divergence of views.  These compromises have emerged from
the bilateral informal consultations held by the Chairman and have been explored through the
written elements addressing conceptual solutions based on the rolling text which had been
circulated by the Chairman for virtually the whole of the Protocol to all delegations by
February 2001.  Whilst these compromises will not satisfy the aspirations of all the
delegations to the Ad Hoc Group, they do, in our view, successfully ensure that the composite
Protocol text achieves its mandate of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the
implementation of the Convention.   The composite Protocol text has successfully retained all
the essential elements for an effective Protocol ranging from definitions and objective
criteria, through compliance measures to measures for scientific and technological exchange
for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation.
The value of the Protocol
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65.  In considering the composite Protocol text, it is important to remember that the BTWC
with its basic prohibitions and obligations has been in force for over 25 years and that the
Protocol is to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the
Convention.  It makes no changes to the basic prohibitions and obligations.  The Protocol
regime is supplementary and additional to the Convention.
66.  The key comparison is thus between the BTWC Protocol regime and the BTWC alone,
including the procedures devolved from its provisions.  A tabulation of the principal
measures in the regime, compared with the procedures of the BTWC alone, clearly brings out
the significant benefits from the Protocol.
BTWC and its Protocol Regime BTWC alone
Mandatory declarations
  -- measures to ensure submission
Confidence-Building Measures
  -- patchy and variable (if made)
Declaration follow-up procedures
  -- analysis of declarations
  -- randomly-selected transparency visits
None
  -- none
  -- none
Declaration clarification procedures
  -- clarification visits
None
  -- none
Voluntary assistance visits None
Non-compliance concerns
  -- Consultations >>> Investigations
Art V consultation procedures
Art VI complaint to UN Security Council
Field investigation Possible UN Secretary-General investigation if
invited by State Party concerned
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BTWC and its Protocol Regime BTWC alone
Facility investigation None
Transfer procedures None
Assistance
  -- provisions detailed
Art VII assistance if UN Security Council
decides a Party has been exposed to danger
International Cooperation
  -- elaborated in detail
  -- Cooperation Committee
Art X provisions
  -- no implementation procedures
  -- none
Organization
  -- CoSP, ExC & Technical Secretariat
None
National implementation
  -- Penal legislation required
  -- National Authority
Art IV National implementation
  -- No penal legislation requirement
  -- None
67.  Taking all of the elements of the BTWC Protocol regime as a whole, it is clear that there
are overall three particularly significant benefits that will accrue from the BTWC Protocol
regime and which are not available with the Convention alone:
BTWC and its Protocol Regime BTWC alone
Measures to increase transparency and build
confidence
Suspicions not addressed -- and over time
reduce international confidence in the regime
Procedures to address non-compliance
concerns
Art V consultations (no teeth)
Art VI complaints to UN SC (not used)
International cooperation and assistance
provisions
No action despite aspirations at successive
Review Conferences
68.  It is evident from the above comparisons that the Protocol regime brings significant and
worthwhile benefits to all States Parties -- both developed and developing  -- over and above
the procedures to uphold the basic prohibitions and obligations of the BTWC, which remain
unchanged.  In addition, the Protocol will be effective, over time, in building confidence
between States Parties that other States Parties are indeed in compliance with the Convention,
thereby reinforcing the norm that work on biological weapons, whether directed against
humans, animals or plants, is totally prohibited.  The Protocol thus brings improved health,
safety, security and prosperity to all States Parties.
69.  It is also appropriate to compare the BTWC Protocol regime with the CWC regime.  The
CWC regime is of considerable relevance to the BTWC Protocol regime for a number of
reasons.  First, there is a close relationship between chemical and biological weapons which
is shown by the CBW spectrum:
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The two regimes rightly overlap for the materials of biological origin such as toxins.   Both
regimes address dual use materials and technology and both have general purpose criteria
which embrace all possible agents, past, present and future.   Indeed the CWC regime is the
one of greatest relevance to the BTWC Protocol regime and it is already evident that National
Authorities for the two regimes are likely to be colocated in a number of countries.
70.  It is hardly surprising that the BTWC Protocol regime has been largely developed from
the CWC regime; it is, however, much more elaborated than the CWC and has been finely
tailored to address those biological agents and facilities of greatest relevance to the
Convention.  There are, however, some particular differences between the CWC regime and
the BTWC Protocol regime largely arising from the fact that the CWC came into force in
1997 with a number of States known to be possessors of chemical weapons and chemical
weapon production facilities whilst the BTWC came into force over 25 years ago.  These
differences are summarised in the Table:
BTWC and its Protocol Regime CWC Regime
No biological weapon stockpiles Declaration of chemical weapon (CW)
stockpiles
Declaration of past offensive biological
weapon programmes
Declaration of chemical weapon production
facilities (CWPFs)
No destruction of biological weapon stockpiles Destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles
No destruction of biological weapon
production facilities
Destruction of chemical weapon production
facilities
No tight timelines Tight timelines for declaration and inspection
of CW and CWPFs
List of agents and toxins
-- No SSSF equivalent
-- Declaration trigger
Scheduled chemicals
-- Single small scale facility (SSSF)
-- Varying regime according to Schedule
27
71.  If the CW and CWPF elements of the CWC are ignored, then the basic architecture of the
BTWC Protocol regime and the CWC regime is the same.  The differences between the
regimes are in the detail with the BTWC Protocol regime having built on the confidence-
building measures agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 and extended at the
Third Review Conference in 1991 as well as being developed from the CWC regime.   In
respect of the monitoring of dual-purpose materials and facilities, the two regimes are very
comparable with the Protocol regime imposing a less onerous but more focussed burden in
respect of declarations and visits whilst the international cooperation provisions are much
more extensive than those of the CWC.  In comparing the BTWC Protocol regime with that
of the CWC, the fact that the BTWC is already in force has to be remembered.
72.  The two regimes are compared in the following Table.
BTWC and its Protocol Regime CWC Regime
Mandatory declarations
  -- measures to ensure submission
Mandatory declarations
  -- no measures to ensure submission
Declaration follow-up procedures
  -- analysis of declarations
  -- randomly-selected transparency visits
Routine inspections of Scheduled chemical
facilities and DOC (discrete organic chemical)
facilities
Declaration clarification procedures
  -- clarification visits
No declaration clarification procedures
   -- implicit not elaborated
Voluntary assistance visits No provision for voluntary assistance visits
   -- implicit not elaborated
Non-compliance concerns
  -- Consultations >>> Investigations
Non-compliance concerns
  -- Consultations >>> Investigations
Field investigation Investigation of alleged use
Facility investigation
-- team size and duration limited
Challenge inspection
-- duration limited
Transfer procedures Transfer controls
Assistance
  -- provisions similar to CWC
Assistance
International Cooperation
  -- elaborated in detail
  -- Cooperation Committee
International Cooperation
  -- not elaborated in detail
  -- no provision for Cooperation Committee
Organization
  -- CoSP, ExC & Technical Secretariat
Organization
  -- CoSP, ExC & Technical Secretariat
National implementation
  -- Penal legislation required
  -- National Authority
National implementation
  -- Penal legislation required
  -- National Authority
73.   The similarities between the two regimes are apparent.  It is evident that the BTWC
Protocol regime is considerably more elaborated, with limitations on the overall number of
visits, team sizes and durations, than the CWC regime.  There are, however, de facto
limitations within the CWC regime through the annual scrutiny of the Organization's
programme and budget by the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties.
On the other hand, there are several areas where the BTWC Protocol regime has additional
provisions that are not specifically included in the CWC regime.
74.  In making an overall comparison of these two regimes, consideration also has to be given
to the intensity of the visits/inspections of the facilities declared under the two regimes (and
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ignoring the CWC inspection regime for chemical weapon and chemical weapon production
and destruction facilities).  It needs to be recalled also that the numbers of facilities declared
under the BTWC Protocol regime has been estimated by several European countries as being
of the order of tens of facilities per European country; this can be compared to the UK
declaration7 under the CWC of over 550 plants at over 150 sites.  Consequently, it can be
expected that the number of declared facilities under the BTWC Protocol regime will be
smaller by a factor of ten.   The CWC regime has an intensity that varies depending on which
Scheduled chemical is produced or used in a facility and reflects the risk to the Convention
with Discrete Organic Chemical (DOC) facilities having a much smaller intensity of routine
inspection.  The BTWC Protocol regime has an intensity of visits that is not dependent on the
type of declared facility and should therefore ensure that all declared facilities that are subject
to randomly-selected visits will receive such visits over time.
75.   In September 1999 in Briefing Paper No. 258, we examined the Ad Hoc Group in order
to identify appropriate criteria against which to evaluate the individual elements of the
emerging Protocol regime and we then made a comparative evaluation using these criteria of
both the emerging Protocol regime and the existing CWC regime.   The conclusions we
reached  were the following:
43.   The CWC regime was finalised in the late 1980s whilst the BTWC Protocol
regimes is currently being finalised -- and has benefitted from the experience gained
by the OPCW and by States Parties in the implementation of the CWC as well as the
other international developments during the past decade.     Thus the BTWC Protocol
regime has been tailored -- and rightly so -- to deal with the particular problems
associated with compliance of the BTWC which includes the necessity to cope with a
situation in which smaller quantities of agent and smaller facilities could be used in a
non-compliant activity.   However, the experience gained from compliance and
verification regimes over the past decade has made it clear that one of the strongest
tools in assessing compliance is the consistency of the information that becomes
available from many sources.  In a world in which more and more information is
being provided on official as well as unofficial websites, it is becoming harder and
harder to be confident that proscribed activities can be hidden in such a way that no
inconsistencies are evident.    In terms of the jigsaw analogy, there is no requirement
to have all the pieces of the jigsaw to be confident of compliance so long as all the
pieces are clearly from the same picture.   It is for this reason that it is vital that the
BTWC Protocol regime is a three pillar regime9 with declarations of which the
completeness and accuracy are ensured through declaration follow-up procedures
and declaration clarification procedures, infrequent visits as part of these declaration
follow-up procedures as well as to implement Protocol Article VII measures, and both
field and facility investigations.
44.   The BTWC Protocol regime can thus be considered in the round and compared
with the CWC regime.   The Protocol declarations will be considerably less onerous
                                                
7Department of Trade and Industry, 1997 Annual Report on the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, February 1998, p.14.
8Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, The Emerging Protocol:  An Integrated Reliable and Effective
Regime, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 25, September 1999.
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
9Douglas J MacEachin, Routine and Challenge:  Two Pillars of Verification, The CBW Conventions Bulletin,
Issue No 39, March 1998, pp.1 - 3.
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than those for the CWC as only tens of facilities will need to be developed in a typical
developed country such as those in Europe.   No CPI information will be required yet
the facilities to be declared will be selected to be those of particular relevance.    The
provisions for ensuring the submission of declarations have no parallel in the CWC
regime and should be effective in ensuring that States Parties to the Protocol comply
with their obligations.   The declaration follow-up procedures with infrequent
randomly-selected/transparency visits will ensure that declarations are accurate with
the potential for extension of such visits to provide advice and technical cooperation
providing a useful bonus for States Parties.   The declaration clarification
procedures, ranging from written correspondence through a consultative meeting to,
if necessary, a clarification visit, will ensure that declarations are complete and
accurate.   Both of these are developments from the CWC regime and should ensure
that the Protocol regime is more reliable.   Investigations are always going to be
highly political in nature and consequently extremely rare events.   They are,
however, vital elements of the overall regime.   The specific Protocol provisions for
implementation of Article X of the BTWC go far beyond the comparable provisions in
the CWC -- and will contribute both to the promotion of universality of the Protocol
and to the increasing of transparency and the building of confidence in compliance.
45.   All in all, the BTWC Protocol is being crafted so that it will achieve the
requirement for an effective and reliable regime which, in accordance with the AHG
mandate, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation  of the
BTWC and thereby strengthen the norm against biological weapons.
We have reexamined that comparative evaluation in the light of the composite Protocol text
and conclude that the conclusions are still valid and apply to the Protocol as detailed in the
composite Protocol text.
Conclusions
76.   This evaluation of the composite Protocol text has shown that it is in many areas
identical to the language in the rolling text and is firmly based on the agreed language out of
square brackets in the rolling text.   Compromises have been adopted to address those issues
where there continued to be a divergence of views.  These compromises have emerged from
the bilateral informal consultations held by the Chairman and have been explored through the
written elements addressing conceptual solutions based on the rolling text which had been
circulated by the Chairman for virtually the whole of the Protocol to all delegations by
February 2001.  Whilst these compromises will not satisfy the aspirations of all the
delegations to the Ad Hoc Group, they do, in our view, successfully ensure that the composite
Protocol text achieves its mandate of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the
implementation of the Convention.   The composite Protocol text has successfully retained
all the essential elements for an effective Protocol ranging from definitions and objective
criteria, through compliance measures to measures for scientific and technological exchange
for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation.
 77.  In considering the composite Protocol text, it needs to be remembered that the BTWC
with its basic prohibitions and obligations has been in force for over 25 years and that the
Protocol is to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the
Convention.  It makes no changes to the basic prohibitions and obligations.  The Protocol
regime is supplementary and additional to the Convention.  Consequently, the key
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comparison is between the BTWC Protocol regime and the BTWC alone.   A tabulation of
the principal measures in the regime, compared with the procedures of the BTWC alone,
clearly brings out the significant benefits from the Protocol.  It is evident that the Protocol
regime will bring significant and worthwhile benefits to all States Parties -- both developed
and developing  -- over and above the procedures to uphold the basic prohibitions and
obligations of the BTWC, which remain unchanged.  In addition, the Protocol will be
effective, over time, in building confidence between States Parties that other States Parties are
indeed in compliance with the Convention, thereby reinforcing the norm that work on
biological weapons, whether directed against humans, animals or plants, is totally prohibited.
The Protocol thus brings improved health, safety, security and prosperity to all States Parties.
78.  A comparison of the BTWC Protocol regime and the CWC regime has shown that the
two regimes are indeed comparable and effective.  It is concluded that the composite Protocol
text has successfully been crafted so that it will achieve the requirement for an effective and
reliable regime which, in accordance with the AHG mandate, will strengthen the
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC and thereby strengthen the norm
against biological weapons.
